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ABSTRACT
In this work, we significantly improve the e ciency of non-
malleable codes in the split state model, by constructing a
code with codeword length (roughly) |s|+9k, where |s| is the
length of the message, and k is the security parameter. This
is a substantial improvement over previous constructions,
both asymptotically and concretely.
Our construction relies on a new primitive which we define
and study, called `-more extractable hash functions. This
notion, which may be of independent interest, is strictly
stronger than the previous notion of extractable hash by
Goldwasser et al. (Eprint ’11) and Bitansky et al. (ITCS
’12, Eprint ’14), yet we can instantiate it under the same
assumption used for the previous extractable hash function
(a variant of the Knowledge of Exponent Assumption).
Keywords
Non-malleable codes, hash functions, split-state model
1. INTRODUCTION
Non-malleable codes were introduced by Dziembowski et
al. [29] as a relaxation of error correction and error detec-
tion codes. They provide security in the following sense:
any modified codeword decodes to the original message or
to a completely unrelated one, with overwhelming probabil-
ity. Non-malleability is defined through a simulation-based
definition, which informally states that, for any tampering
function f , we require the existence of a simulator that simu-
lates the tampering e↵ect, by only inspecting f , i.e., without
making any assumptions on the distribution of the encoded
message.
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Various applications of non-malleable codes have been pro-
posed, such as CCA secure encryption schemes [21], non-
malleable commitments [5], and most notably, their appli-
cation against malicious modification attacks, also known as
tampering attacks. Indeed, using non-malleable codes to se-
cure implementations against tampering attacks was the mo-
tivation in the original work by Dziembowski et al. [29]. Due
to their important application, constructing non-malleable
codes has drawn a lot of attention, as we elaborate below.
The split-state model [29, 40]. Ideally, we would like to
achieve non-malleability against arbitrary function classes,
yet, this task is not achievable, as it is also not achievable
in the case of error correction/detection codes. As discussed
in [29], assuming a tampering function f that computes the
decoding of the codeword c = Enc(s), where s is the private
message, and computes c˜ = Enc(s + 1), we receive a tam-
pered codeword, c˜, that decodes to a message, highly related
to the original one. Therefore, no secure construction can
exist against any function class that contains f , which con-
cludes that, restricting the function class, is inherent.
Motivated by the above, various function classes have
been studied, and in particular, the split-state function class
has been identified and extensively studied in the literature.
Briefly speaking, in the split-state model, private memory
is split in two parts, L, R, and the attacker may apply any
function f = (f1, f2) that results in a tampered memory
equal to (f1(L), f2(R)). This is a plausible model since in
many cases sensitive data may be split in two storage de-
vices that are physically separated. Note that the model
can generalize to multiple split states, with the two-state
variant being the hardest to achieve; we only consider the
two state variant in this paper.
Broadly speaking, (explicit) constructions of non-malleable
codes in the split-state model can be categorized into infor-
mation -theoretic and computational.1 In a recent break-
through result [4], Aggarwal et al. provide the first polynomial-
time, information-theoretic, non-malleable code for multi-
bit messages, thus significantly improving over the work
of [28], which only supports single-bit messages. The en-
coder produces codewords of length O((|s|+ k)7), where |s|
1The work of [29] showed that in the random oracle
model, there exist e cient non-malleable codes against split-
state tampering functions. However, their approach uses a
probabilistic argument thus providing only a proof of ex-
istence and not an explicit construction. Therefore, their
random oracle result does not count as an explicit construc-
tion. Currently, there is no known explicit constructions in
the random oracle model to our knowledge.
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denotes the length of the encoded message, s, and k is the
security parameter.2 Later Aggarwal et al. [3] proposed an-
other construction that achieves codeword length roughly
O(|s|) (for su ciently large |s|).3
In the computational setting, Liu and Lysyanskaya [40]
construct a non-malleable code using cryptographic tools
such as leakage resilient public-key encryption [43], and ro-
bust non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs [26]. The
rate of their construction is not given in the original pa-
per and a textbook instantiation with public-key encryption
combined with NIZKs, would not yield a rate 1 code; how-
ever, using state of the art tools, we can provide a better
instantiation of [40], with codeword length |s| + O(k2), see
Table 1.1. Recently, Aggarwal et al. [2] presented a compiler
that transforms any low rate, non-malleable code, to a rate
1, computationally secure, non-malleable code. The under-
lying encoding must satisfy a notion, strictly stronger than
non-malleability, called augmented non-malleability, which,
as it is stated in [2], can be satisfied by the construction
of [4]. Thus, by instantiating the compiler of [2] with the
construction of [4], the codeword’s length becomes |s| +
O(k7).
Although the above constructions achieve “rate 1” asymp-
totically, i.e., the ratio of message to codeword length is
1, as the message length, |s|, goes to infinity, in practice,
the induced overhead can still be too large, when consider-
ing short messages (e.g., a 160-bit cryptographic key), even
without counting the potentially large hidden constants in
the asymptotic notation. Thus, even though the problem of
“optimal-rate” has been solved in theory, it is still unclear
what the practical implications of those constructions are.
Given the current state of the art, as discussed above, con-
structing codes with very small overhead, including the hid-
den constant, remains still one of the most important open
questions in the area. Note, that the natural lower bound for
code length is merely |s| + k, and none of the known, com-
putational or information-theoretic, constructions, match it,
even asymptotically.
1.1 Our Results
In this work, we tackle the challenge to construct truly
e cient non-malleable codes in the split-state model. To
achieve this goal, we introduce a new cryptographic primi-
tive, called `-more extractable hash function family, and then
we construct an e cient code, using our new tool. Our ap-
proach is modular: first we propose and formalize `-more
extractable hash function families, and then we demonstrate
their application to non-malleable codes.
Briefly speaking, `-more extractable hash function families
capture the idea that, if an adversary, given ` hash values
v1, . . . , v`, produces a new valid hash value v˜, then it must
know a pre-image of v˜. This is a generalization of the notion
of extractable hash functions by Bitansky et al. [10] and
Goldwasser et al. [49], which corresponds to the ` = 0 case
(i.e., the adversary gets no access to valid hash values, prior
to producing its own value), and is somewhat reminiscent of
the strengthening of simulation-soundness in the context of
2The result of [4] can be further improved assuming spe-
cific conjectures.
3 The hidden constants might be “astronomical” as they
depend on results in additive combinatorics, as pointed out
in the conclusion of their work [3].
zero-knowlege proofs [48]. Our generalization is strict: we
prove the following (informally stated):
Theorem 1.1 (Informal). Extractable hash 6=) 1-
more extractable hash.
The subtlety comes from the fact that the `-more attacker
might get an “unfair advantage” in producing a valid hash
value, for which it does not possess a pre-image, because
of the ` additional inputs; e.g., by modifying the vi’s in
some suitable way. Indeed, we show that the extractable
hash function family of Bitansky et al. [10] is easily mal-
leable, and thus exploitable by “1-more” attackers. This
demonstrates that our new notion of `-more extractability
is strictly stronger than the previous one.
Our next step is to achieve such a stronger notion. We
show, somewhat surprisingly, that the stronger notion can
be achieved under the same assumptions used by the con-
struction of Bitansky et al. [10], i.e., a variant of the Knowl-
edge of Exponent Assumption (KEA) and DLog. Thus, we
conclude that, even though `-more extractability is strictly
stronger, KEA and DLog are still su cient to achieve it.
Theorem 1.2 (Informal). DLog and (a variant of)
KEA imply `-more extractable hash.
We remark that KEA is non-falsifiable (cf. [42]), and it
is indeed a strong assumption. However, one can argue
that non-falsifiability might be inherent for extractable hash
functions, and thus `-more extractability. We recall that Bi-
tansky et al. [10] showed that, extractable hash function
families imply succinct non-interactive argument of knowl-
edge (SNARK), and Gentry and Wichs [35] showed that
SNARK is unlikely to be constructed based on falsifiable as-
sumptions. Thus, non-falsifiable assumptions are likely to be
inherent for achieving (`-more) extractability. We note that
some variants of KEA were shown to contradict (public-coin)
di↵ering-inputs obfuscation and indistinguishability obfus-
cation [12, 13]; the variant we use is suitably defined to cir-
cumvent this contradiction.
Next, we construct non-malleable codes using `-more ex-
tractable hash functions. The crux of our methodology is
to adapt the “public-key-encrypt-and-prove”method of [40],
using our new `-more extractable hash, yielding e↵ectively a
“(one-time-symmetric-key-encrypt)-and-hash” approach for
obtaining non-malleable codes. In particular, we prove the
following (informally stated):
Theorem 1.3 (Informal). `-more extractable hash (
with some additional properties) implies non-malleable codes
in the split-state model.
Our scheme produces codewords of length |s| + 9 · k +
2 · log2(k). In Table 1.1 we compare our construction with
the current state of the art on the split-state setting. Our
scheme is truly e cient in terms of codeword length, and it
is one order of magnitude better than the combination of [40]
+ [2] + [43] + [37], which is the most competitive scheme
that can be constructed,4 based on the current state of the
4For the sake of this comparison, we instantiate [40] with
the e cient zero-knowledge proofs of [37] and the leakage
resilient public-key encryption of [43]; moreover we observe
that the resulting code is compatible with the compiler of [2]
(it satisfies“augmented non-malleability”, a property defined
in the latter paper) and thus we can make the resulting
system rate 1. This provides codeword length |s| + O(k2),
cited in Table 1.1.
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art. We note that, existing constructions in the information-
theoretic setting, such as [3,4], and the work built on top of
them, e.g., [2], might require very large constants, inherited
by the results in additive combinatorics (cf. conclusion of
the work [3]).
1.2 Technical Overview
Concepts of extractability and `-more extractability.
Informally, a family of functions, H, is extractable, if for a
uniform h 2 H, sampling an element v 2 Image(h), with-
out actually evaluating the function on a pre-image s, such
that h(s) = v, is infeasible. This idea is formalized in the
following way: for any algorithm Av, there exists an extrac-
tor EAv , such that, if Av produces some v 2 Image(h), EAv
outputs s, such that h(s) = v. Clearly, such families are in-
teresting only if they posses some sort of hardness property,
like one-wayness, otherwise the problem is trivial.
In this work, we introduce the notion of `-more extractable
hash function families, for which the extractability property
holds, even if Av is given access to ` valid hash values. Even
though `-more extractability looks similar to extractabil-
ity (0-more extractability in our definition), we provide a
separation between those two primitives. Before explaining
further details, we first recall the underlying assumption,
t-KEA, and the construction of Bitansky et al. [10].
t-KEA and the extractable hash function family of [10].
Assuming a group G, of prime order p, the Knowledge of
Exponent Assumption (KEA), introduced by Damg˚ard [25],
states the following: any adversary that is given a generator,
g, of G, and a random group element ga, produces the pair
(gs, gas), only if it “knows” the exponent s. The assumption
was later extended by [8, 38], by requiring that, given gr1 ,
gar1 , gr2 , gar2 , it is infeasible to produce v = gr1s1+r2s2 and
va, without “knowing” s1, s2. This assumption, generalized
for t = poly(log |G|) pairs gri , gari , is referred to as t-KEA
by [10].
An element from the hash function family of [10] is de-
scribed by the pair (gr, gar), for uniformly random vector r,
and element a. Note that, gr denotes the value (gr1 , . . . , grt),
where r = (r1, . . . , rt). The hash of a message s = (s1, . . . , st),
is the pair (ghr,si, gahr,si), where hr, si denotes the inner
product of r, s. It is not hard to see that the hash value
can be computed e ciently given the message and the de-
scription of the hash function, and assuming the t-KEA, the
above hash function family is extractable, or in our terminol-
ogy, 0-more extractable. As we argue in the next paragraph,
this family is not 1-more extractable, and thus, extractabil-
ity does not imply `-more extractability.
1-more Extractable Collision Resistant Hash (ECRH).
Suppose the adversary receives a hash value v = h(s) =
(ghr,si, gahr,si), for some unknown message s, and then com-
putes v0 = vx = (ghr,xsi, gahr,xsi), for some non-zero x, of
its choice. Clearly, the new hash value v0 equals h(xs), and
thus, it is valid. Then, assuming an extractor for the cur-
rent family, under the “1-more” setting, we can retrieve the
original message s, by first extracting xs and then dividing
it by x. This idea can be turned into a DLog solver, and
thus, assuming the hardness of DLog with respect to G,
5The size of the CRS is O(k), see [37]. The size of the
CRS in our construction is roughly 32k bits, cf. Section 4.
CRS size is independent of |s|.
we show in Lemma 3.5, that the above construction is not
1-more extractable.
Next we present our strategy for constructing 1-more ECRH.
Our main observation is that, even though the above hash
function family is malleable, the modified hash value, v0, has
some structure: it is the hash value of the message yielded
after applying an a ne transformation on the original mes-
sage, s, (in the above case, the a ne transformation was
x · s). Interestingly, we show that under the t-KEA, apply-
ing an a ne transformation is the only thing the adversary
can do! In particular, we show that, if the adversary out-
puts a valid, new hash value, v0, then there exists an extrac-
tor that extracts an a ne transformation on the underlying
message. So, in order to make the hash non-malleable (and
then 1-more extractable), we first encode c  Enc(s) using
a non-malleable code against a ne functions, and then we
compute v = (ghr,ci, gahr,ci). This approach can be viewed
as a computational analogue of a non-malleable reduction,
as previously used by [4], and then formally presented by [3]
(both are in the information-theoretic setting).
It turns out that, in order to apply the methodology de-
scribed above, a slightly stronger flavor of non-malleability is
required for the underlying code, which we formalize as ran-
domness simulatable non-malleable codes. Below, we briefly
discuss this notion and we give the main idea of the proposed
scheme.
Randomness simulatable NM codes against a ne
tampering. This notion of non-malleability is stronger
than the standard one, in the sense that, besides simulating
the pre-image of the tampered codeword, s˜, the simulator,
also produces the randomness of the encoder, s˜r, such that
the encoding of s˜ with randomness s˜r, produces the tam-
pered codeword. The main idea of our construction method
is given in the next paragraph.
For any message s, the encoder secret shares s into (s1, s2),
using a two-out-of-two, additive, secret sharing scheme, and
outputs c = (s1, s2, s
2
1, s
2
2). Then, for any codeword c =
(s1, s2, s
0
1, s
0
2), decoding proceeds as follows: if s
2
i = s
0
i, for
i 2 {1, 2}, the decoder outputs s1+s2, otherwise, it outputs
?. An a ne tampering function, f , against the code is de-
scribed by the pair (b, d), and the application of f on a code-
word c, yields the codeword d · c+ b. We prove security of
the above code by considering the following cases (roughly).
If d = 0, then the tampered codeword is completely over-
written by b, and clearly, the output of the decoder depends
only on b. If d 6= 0, then, we argue that, either the attack
leaves the codeword intact, i.e., d = 1,b = 0, or the de-
coding of the tampered codeword is ?, with overwhelming
probability.
In Section 5.2, we formally define randomness simulatable,
non-malleable codes, and prove security for the proposed
scheme. It is worth to point out that the idea of construct-
ing a NM-code for a ne functions, as an intermediate step
for providing split-state codes, was also followed by [4], still,
our technique di↵ers significantly, and their code does not
directly satisfy our requirements. Moreover, in [22] the au-
thors construct AMD codes, still their notions are slightly
di↵erent and do fit in our framework.
NM codes against split-state tampering. Our con-
struction of non-malleable codes is inspired by the one of
Liu and Lysyanskaya [40], so we first recall their construc-
tion. To encode a message s, their encoder outputs (sk, (pk,
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Scheme Codeword length Model Assumption
[4] O
 
(|s|+ k)7 log7(|s|+ k)  Information-theoretic N/A
[3]3 O(max{|s|, k}) Information-theoretic N/A
[4] + [2] |s|+O  k7  Computational Authenticated Encryption (AE)
[40] + [2] + [43] + [37] |s|+O  k2  Computational, CRS5 Leakage-Resilient PKE + robust NIZK
This work |s|+ 9 · k + 2 · log2(k) Computational, CRS 1-time Leakage-Resilient AE + KEA
Table 1: Comparison of multi-bit NMC’s in the split-state model. k is the security parameter. In the
information-theoretic setting, typically security breaks with probability ✏ = 2 ⌦(k); in the computational
setting, we have ✏ = negl(k), e.g., ✏ = k !(1) or 2 ⌦(k), depending on how strong the underlying computational
assumption is.
Esk(s),⇡)), where E is the encryption algorithm of a leakage
resilient, semantically secure, public-key encryption scheme
(KGen,E,D), sk, pk, denote the secret key and public key,
respectively, and ⇡ is a non-interactive proof of knowledge
(robust NIZK), that proves the existence of a valid secret
key, decrypting the ciphertext to the message s.
Our construction significantly improves the e ciency of
[40] by refining their approach: (1) we replace the leakage
resilient public key encryption with a one-time, symmetric-
key, leakage resilient authenticated encryption; (2) we re-
place the (robust) NIZK proof with our 1-more-ECRH. Our
encoder works as follows: to encode a message s, the en-
coder outputs
⇣
(r, sk), (e = Esk(s), v = h(r, sk))
⌘
, where E
is the encryption algorithm of a symmetric, leakage resilient
authenticated encryption scheme, sk is the secret key, h is a
(randomized) 1-more ECRH.
Here the reader can easily observe that, using a func-
tion h that is extractable, or in our terminology, 0-more
extractable, is not a good idea. Since generic authenti-
cated encryption schemes guarantee security only if the se-
cret key remains the same, it is possible to break security
if one modifies sk as well. In fact, it is possible to con-
struct an authenticated encryption such that it becomes
insecure if the secret key is modified. Therefore, if the
hash is malleable, then the tampering function may com-
pute (e0 = Esk0(s+ 1), v0 = h(r, sk0)), where the sk0 is a bad
key that does not provide security. The tampered codeword
clearly decodes to a related message, and thus cannot be
non-malleable. Our 1-more extractability property resolves
this issue: even if the attacker is given access to a valid
hash value v, it cannot produce a valid hash value v0, unless
it knows a valid pre-image. Proving security for the above
construction requires to handle multiple subtleties, and we
refer the reader to Section 4 for further details.
Putting things together. We construct a one-time, sym-
metric, leakage resilient authenticated encryption scheme,
that in order to sustain 2·k+log2 k bits of leakage, it requires
key and ciphertext length |s|+5 · k+2 · log2(k) (cf. Section
7). In addition, for our 1-more ECRH we have |r| = |v| = 2k
(see Constructions 5.5 and 5.2). Therefore, the total code-
word length is |s| + 9 · k + 2 · log2(k). The encoding and
decoding procedures require 128 group operations (64 ex-
ponentiations plus 64 multiplications), independently of the
message length, plus the cost of one-time authenticated en-
cryption and decryption, respectively.
1.3 Related work
The first non-malleable code in the split-state model, for
the information-theoretic setting was proposed by [28], yet
their scheme can only encode single-bit messages. Subse-
quent constructions for multi-bit messages are discussed in
the previous section. Non-malleable codes for other function
classes have been extensively studied, e.g., bit-wise inde-
pendent tampering [29], bounded-size function classes [32],
the k-split setting [18], block-wise tampering [16, 20], and
bounded depth and fan-in circuits [6]. The work of [3] devel-
ops beautiful connections among di↵erent function classes.
Other aspects of non-malleable codes have also been stud-
ied, such as rate-function class tradeo↵, in the information-
theoretic setting [19]. Other variants of non-malleable codes
have been proposed, such as continuous non-malleable codes
[30], augmented non-malleable codes [2], locally decodable/up-
datable non-malleable codes [17, 23, 31], which were used
to secure the implementation of RAM computation. Leak-
age resilience was also considered as an additional feature,
e.g., [17, 23,40].
KEAs and previous work. In [25], Damg˚ard introduces
KEA to construct a CCA-secure encryption scheme. In [8,
38], the authors extend the assumption of [25], and construct
three-round, zero-knowledge arguments. Abe and Fehr [1]
construct the first perfect NIZK for NP with adaptive sound-
ness, by extending the assumption of [8]. Prabhakaran and
Xue [47] constructed statistically-hiding sets for trapdoor
DDH groups [27], by introducing a new knowledge assump-
tion. Gennaro et al. [34] proved that a modified version of
the Okamoto-Tanaka key-agreement protocol [44] satisfies
perfect forward secrecy against fully active attackers, by in-
troducing a new knowledge assumption. In [9–11, 33, 36],
the authors construct succinct, non-interactive, arguments
of knowledge (SNARKs), and NIZKs, while in [41], Mie
presents a private information retrieval (PIR), scheme. In
[14,15,24], Canetti and Dakdouk provide an extensive study
on extractable functions. In [45], Parno et al. show how to
perform verifiable computation, e ciently.
In [12,13], the authors show that, assuming indistinguisha-
bility obfuscation [7], extractable one-way functions, and
thus ECRHs, does not exist against adversaries receiving
arbitrary, polynomial-size, auxiliary input, if the extrac-
tor is fixed before the attacker’s auxiliary input. On the
other hand, they show that, under standard assumptions,
extractable one-way functions, may exist against adversaries
with bounded auxiliary input.
In this work, and as it is suggested by [12], we consider
individual auxiliary, i.e., we allow the auxiliary info of the
extractor to depend on the attacker’s auxiliary info, and
therefore, we do not contradict the impossibility results of
[12, 13].
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2. PRELIMINARIES
In this section we present basic primitives and notation
that we use in our constructions.
Definition 2.1 (Notation). N+, R+, denote the set
of positive natural and real numbers, respectively. For t 2
N+, [t] is the set {1, . . . , t}. For vectors x,y, hx,yi is the
inner product of x, y, and [x]i is the i-th coordinate of x.
For strings x, y, x||y, is the concatenation of x, y, and
|x| denotes the length of x. For a distribution D over a
set X , x  D, denotes sampling an element x 2 X , ac-
cording to D, x
$ X , denotes sampling a uniform ele-
ment x, from X , and UX denotes the uniform distribution
over X . The statistical distance between two random vari-
ables X, Y , with range D, is denoted by  (X,Y ), i.e.,
 (X,Y ) = 12
P
u2D |Pr[X = u]   Pr[Y = u]|. Moreover,
“⇡” and “⇡c”, denote statistical and computational indistin-
guishability, respectively. A function f : N ! R+ is negli-
gible, if for every positive polynomial poly(·), and all su -
ciently large k, f(k)  1/poly(k), and negl(k) denotes an
unspecified, negligible function, in k. For a random vari-
able X, H1(X) and H˜1(X), denote the min-entropy, and
average min-entropy, of X, respectively. Finally, for any
element g and vector r = (r1, . . . , rt), g
r = (gr1 , . . . , grt).
Below, we define coding schemes, based on the definitions
of [29, 40].
Definition 2.2. (coding scheme in the common ref-
erence string (crs) model [40]) A (, ⌫)-coding scheme
in the CRS model, , ⌫ 2 N, is a triple of algorithms (Init,
Enc,Dec) such that: Init is a randomized algorithm which
receives 1k, where k denotes the security parameter, and
produces a common reference string ⌃ 2 {0, 1}poly(k), and
(Enc(1k,⌃, ·),Dec(1k, ⌃, ·)) is a (, ⌫)-coding scheme, , ⌫ =
poly(k).
For brevity, 1k will be omitted from the inputs of Enc and
Dec. In the full version of the paper we provide the standard
definitions of coding schemes and non-malleability. Now we
state the definition of strong non-malleability in the CRS
model based on the definitions of [29,40].
Definition 2.3. (strong non-malleability in the crs
model [29,40]) Let (Init,Enc,Dec) be a (, ⌫)-coding scheme
in the common reference string model, and F be a family of
functions f : {0, 1}⌫ ! {0, 1}⌫ . For any CRS ⌃, f 2 F and
s 2 {0, 1}, define the tampering experiment
Tamper⌃,fs
def
=
⇢
c Enc(⌃, s), c˜ f⌃(c), s˜ = Dec(⌃, c˜)
Output same⇤ if c˜ = c, and s˜ otherwise.
 
which is a random variable over the randomness of Enc and
Dec. The coding scheme (Init,Enc,Dec) is strongly non-
malleable with respect to the function family F , if for each
f 2 F and any s0, s1 2 {0, 1},n⇣
⌃,Tamper⌃,fs0
⌘o
k2N
⇡
n⇣
⌃,Tamper⌃,fs1
⌘o
k2N
,
where ⌃  Init(1k), and “⇡” may refer to statistical, or
computational, indistinguishability, with parameter k.
According to the standard definition of non-malleability, the
decoding procedure is not randomized, however, as it is sug-
gested by Ball et al. [6] Dec may be randomized.
Next we state the t-variant, due to [10], of the Knowledge
of Exponent assumption (KEA), [8, 25, 38], with individual
auxiliary inputs for adversary and extractor, which is known
not to contradict the impossibility results of [12, 13].
Assumption 2.4 (t-KEA assumption). Let t 2 N.
There exists a group generation algorithm G, such that for
any pair (G, g) sampled according to G(1k), where G is a
group of prime order p 2 (2k 1, 2k), the following holds: for
any PPT algorithm A with auxiliary input auxA 2 {0, 1}poly(k),
there exist PPT extractor EA with auxiliary input auxE 2
{0, 1}poly(k), such that for all su ciently large k 2 N,
Pr
(G,g) G(1k)
(a,r)
$ Zp⇥Ztp

(v, v0) A(gr, gar, auxA), v0 = va :
x EA(gr, gar, auxE) ^ ghr,xi 6= v
 
 negl(k).
Below, we define the class of a ne functions.
Definition 2.5 (The function family Fa↵). For any
setM and any t 2 N+, we define the following function class
Fa↵ = {f(s) = d · s+ b | b, s 2Mt, d 2M}.
Next we recall the definition of extractable hash of [10].
The definition can be modified to have di↵erent auxiliary
inputs for adversary and extractor as the t-KEA above.
Definition 2.6 (Extractable hash [10]). An e ciently
samplable hash function ensemble H = {Hk}k2N is extractable,
if for any PPT algorithm A, there exists a PPT extractor
EHA , such that for all large k 2 N and any auxiliary input
aux 2 {0, 1}poly(k):
Pr
h Hk

y  A(h, aux), 9x : h(x) = y :
x0  EHA (h, aux) ^ h(x0) 6= y
 
 negl(k).
Below, we define the split-state functions class, Fss, and
the  -bit leakage function class L . A definition for split-
state leakage functions was considered in [40].
Definition 2.7 (The split-state function family Fss).
For any, even, ⌫ 2 N and any e ciently computable function
f : {0, 1}⌫ ! {0, 1}⌫ , f 2 Fss, if there exist e ciently com-
putable functions f1 : {0, 1}⌫/2 ! {0, 1}⌫/2, f2 : {0, 1}⌫/2 !
{0, 1}⌫/2, such that for every x1, x2 2 {0, 1}⌫/2 ⇥ {0, 1}⌫/2,
f(x1||x2) = f1(x1)|| f2(x2).
Definition 2.8 (The  -bit leakage function class L ).
For any   2 N, L  is the set of the e ciently computable
functions that output   bits, i.e., for any g 2 L , g : {0, 1}⇤ !
{0, 1} .
Next, we state the definition of semantically secure authen-
ticated encryption, against one time leakage.
Definition 2.9. (semantically secure authenticated
encryption against one time leakage) Let k be the se-
curity parameter, let (KGen,E,D) be a symmetric encryption
scheme and let L be a set of functions. Then, (KGen,E,D) is
authenticated, semantically secure against one-time leakage
with respect to L, if
1. (Correctness): For every message s, Pr[Dsk(Esk(s)) =
s] = 1, where sk KGen(1k).
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2. (Semantic security): for any function g 2 L and
any two messages s0, s1, the following distributions are
(either computationally or statistically) indistinguish-
able: ⇣
Esk(s0), g(sk)
⌘
⇡
⇣
Esk(s1), g(sk)
⌘
,
where sk KGen(1k).
3. (Unforgeability): For every PPT algorithm A =
(A1,A2), the probability
Pr

e0 6= e ^ Dsk(e0) 6= ?
     sk KGen(1k); (s, st) A1(1k);e Esk(s); e0  A2(e, st)
 
is negligible in k.
Here, it should be noted that the leakage function is being
defined by the attacker before receiving the challenge cipher-
text, otherwise semantic security breaks.
3. `-MORE EXTRACTABLE HASH FUNC-
TION FAMILIES
In this section we define the notion of `-more extractable
hash function families, and we provide a general discussion
on the primitive.
Definition 3.1. (`-more extractable hash function
families) For ` 2 N, an e ciently samplable hash function
ensemble H = {Hk}k2N, is `-more extractable, if for any
PPT algorithm Av and any auxAv 2 {0, 1}poly(k), there ex-
ist a PPT extractor EHAv and auxE 2 {0, 1}poly(k), such that
for all PPT algorithms As, any large k 2 N and any vector
of messages s = (s1, . . . , s`),
Pr
hz Hk

Exps,hzAv,As,EHAv
(`, auxAv , auxE) = 1
 
 negl(k),
where,
Exps,hzAv,As,EHAv
(`, auxAv , auxE) :
8i 2 [`], sri  U{0,1}poly(k) , vi = hz(sri , si)
(hash computation)
sr = (sr1 , . . . , sr`),v = (v1, . . . , v`)
(v˜, st) Av(hz,v, auxAv ) (hash tampering)
(sˆr, sˆ) EHAv (hz,v, auxE) (pre-image extraction)
(s˜r, s˜) As (hz, sr, s, st) (pre-image tampering)
If hz(s˜r, s˜) = v˜ ^ 8i : v˜ 6= vi ^ hz(sˆr, sˆ) 6= v˜, return 1
otherwise, return 0
The main steps in the above experiment are the following.
Initially, we sample randomness for the hash, and perform
the hash computation over ` 2 N, pre-images. For determin-
istic hash function families we just omit randomness sam-
pling, and we compute the hash, only using the messages.
The challenge for the attacker Av, is to produce a valid hash
value v˜, given ` has values, denoted as v, and auxiliary infor-
mation auxAv . Then, the extractor EHAv is executed, given v
and its own auxiliary input auxE . Notice, that, we allow the
auxiliary input of the extractor to depend on the attacker’s
auxiliary input.6 Finally, the adversary As produces a valid
pre-image for v˜, while given all information generated dur-
ing the execution. The output of the experiment is 1, if Av
6For this reason our definition is not contradicting the
impossibility results of [12, 13].
produces a valid hash value v˜, As produces a valid pre-image
for v˜, while the extractor fails.
Leaving aside the fact that the above definition consid-
ers randomized function families, the major di↵erence be-
tween the current definition and the one given by Bitansky
et al. [9, 10] (Definition 2.6), is two-fold: first the “`-more”
generalization that allows the attacker to have access to `
valid hash values for which it does not know the pre-images,
prior to delivering its own hash value. Second, the intro-
duction of the algorithm As, that takes the place of the
existential quantifier that appears in the original definition.
This is in fact a weakening of the original definition, in the
sense that the extractor is allowed to fail in case a pre-image
exists but is not e ciently computable based on the view of
the adversary (this would not be allowed in the original def-
inition).
Note, that, the existence ofAs does not trivialize the prob-
lem for the extractor since the extractor is challenged to pro-
duce a valid pre-image for v˜, given only the code of Av and
its own auxiliary input (and in particular it lacks access to
the state of Av and the program of As).
It is easy to see that, constructing `-more extractable hash
function families that are non-compressing, can be achieved
using existing tools, such as robust NIZKs [26]. Here we
construct an `-more extractable, collision resistant, hash
(ECRH) function family, achieving length-e ciency compa-
rable to that of a regular hash function.
In the following lemma we prove that, for any `-more
ECRH function family, the output of the extractor should
match the output of As, in case both of them output valid
pre-images, otherwise we break collision resistance.
Lemma 3.2. Let H = {Hk}k2N be a collision resistant,
`-more extractable, e ciently samplable, hash function en-
semble. Then, for any Av, auxAv , EHAv , auxE , As, s =
(s1, . . . , s`), `, as they were defined in Definition 3.1, the
probability
Pr
hz Hk
"
(sˆr, sˆ) 6= (s˜r, s˜)
      Exp
s,hz
Av,As,EHAv
(`, auxAv , auxE) = 0
hz(s˜r, s˜) = v˜, v˜ 6= vi, i 2 [`]
#
is negligible in k.
For the proof see the full version of the paper.
Next, we show a separation of 0-more extractability and
general `-more extractability as we discussed in the intro-
duction. In particular, we prove that the 0-more extractable
hash of [10] is not 1-more extractable. Before doing so, we
first revisit their construction, which is based on the t-KEA
assumption (Assumption 2.4).
Construction 3.3. (0-more extractable hash from
t-kea [10]) Let G be a group-generation algorithm. An in-
stance of a (kt, 2k)-compressing, hash function family, H⇤ =
(Gen⇤, h⇤), with respect to G, is defined as follows:
1. Gen⇤(1k): sample (G, g, p)  G(1k), p 2 (2k 1, 2k),
(a, r)
$ Zp ⇥ Ztp, where p = |G|, and output z =
(G, gr, gar).
2. Hashing computation: on input s, compute h⇤z(s) =
(ghr,si, ghar,si).
In [10] the authors prove that Construction 3.3 is collision
resistant.
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Lemma 3.4. (collision resistance for construction
3.3 [10]) Assuming the hardness of the discrete logarithm
problem, with respect to a group G, Construction 3.3 is col-
lision resistant, with respect to G.
The above construction is also extractable with respect to
Definition 2.6 and 0-more extractable, where both properties
follow from the t-KEA assumption. In the following lemma
we prove that Construction 3.3 is not 1-more extractable.
Lemma 3.5. (construction 3.3 is not 1-more extrac-
table) Let H⇤ be the hash function family of Construction
3.3, with respect to a group generation algorithm G. Then,
assuming the di culty of the discrete logarithm problem for
G, H⇤ is not 1-more extractable.
In the introduction, we argued that the hash function fam-
ily of Construction 3.3 is highly malleable, and thus not 1-
more extractable, under the discrete logarithm assumption.
We formalize the proof in the full version.
4. A NON-MALLEABLE CODE AGAINST
SPLIT-STATE TAMPERING
In this section, we present our construction of non-malleable
codes against split-state tampering functions. Our construc-
tion requires (i) a one-time, authenticated, symmetric-key
encryption scheme that is also leakage resilient, and (ii) a
1-more ECRH.
Construction 4.1. Let Hk = (Gen, h) be a hash func-
tion family, and let (KGen,E,D) be a symmetric encryption
scheme. We define a coding scheme (Init,Enc,Dec), as fol-
lows:
• Init(1k): sample z  Gen(1k) and set ⌃ = z.
• Enc(⌃, ·): let s be the input to the encoder. The en-
coder samples sk  KGen(1k), r $ {0, 1}poly(k), e  
Esk(s), and outputs
⇣
r, sk, e, hz(r, sk)
⌘
. In particular,
the left part of the codeword is (r, sk), while the right
part is (e, hz(r, sk)).
• Dec(⌃, ·): let (r, sk, e, v) be the input to Dec. If hz(r, sk)
= v, the decoder outputs Dsk(e), otherwise, it outputs
?.
Since the input message to hz, sk, possesses adequate en-
tropy, it is possible to omit r in the above construction, still
for the sake of clarity we stick to the formulation provided in
Definition 3.1 and we use independent randomness for hash-
ing sk. In what follows we prove that Construction 4.1 is
strongly non-malleable against Fss (Definition 2.7), assum-
ing that for any f = (f1, f2) 2 Fss, f1, f2, a↵ect (r, sk) and
(e, v), independently, i.e., we assume the strings r||sk, e||v,
are of length ⌫/2, where ⌫ is the length the codeword.7
Intuition for the construction. Before formally ana-
lyzing the construction, we first discuss the ideas on why
our construction is secure. Consider a split-state tamper-
ing function (f1, f2), where f1 is applied to (r, sk), and f2 is
applied to (e, v). To prove non-malleability, roughly speak-
ing, we need to simulate the tampering experiment without
knowing the underlying message distribution. A first idea is
7This can always be achieved using padding.
to simulate the left side with (r0, sk0), and the right side with
(e0 = Esk0(0), v0 = h(r0, sk0)), where r0, sk0 is fresh random-
ness and key, respectively, hoping to infer the final outcome
of the tampering experiment correctly due to the semantic
security of the encryption.
There are several subtleties in doing so. First and fore-
most, the simulator needs to be able to produce the decod-
ing of the codeword in case v0 is modified by f2. This is
where 1-more extractability will be used to obtain a valid
pre-image, (rˆ, sˆk). It might be very tempting to conclude
the simulation by outputting the decrypted message Dsˆk(eˆ)
(where eˆ is the modified codeword). However, this may not
be consistent with the real-world experiment, as the values
produced by the extractor (rˆ, sˆk) might not be consistent
with the output of f1. To check consistency, the simulator
would want to check the output of f1, yet such a simulation
would be impossible to prove since it depends on sk, where
the indistinguishability between e0 and e does not hold in the
presence of it. To go around this, we use a similar technique
to Liu and Lysyanskaya [40], who observed that, the equal-
ity test between f1(rˆ, sˆk) and f1(r, sk) can be performed via
the leakage of a universal hash (cf. the full version) with
log2 k bits of output. Putting this to our setting, by requir-
ing the encryption (KGen,E,D) to be a one-time semanti-
cally secure, symmetric-key authenticated encryption, that
is secure under 2k + log2 k bits of leakage, is su cient to
facilitate the simulation. We also note that the case when
v0 is not modified by f2 can be easily taken care of by the
security of the authenticated encryption: as long as the key
is not modified, any attempt to modify the ciphertext will
result in an invalid ciphertext.
Theorem 4.2. Let k be the security parameter, Hk be a
1-more extractable hash function family that outputs  (k)
bits,  (k) = poly(k), and let (KGen,E,D) be an authen-
ticated, semantically secure, symmetric encryption scheme,
that is leakage resilient against L ,  (k) = !(log k) +  (k).
Then, Construction 4.1 is strongly non-malleable against
Fss.
Proof. Following the definition of strong non-malleability
(Definition 2.3), we need to prove that for any f = (f1, f2) 2
Fss and any pair of messages s0, s1, (⌃,Tamperf,⌃s0 ) ⇡c
(⌃,Tamperf,⌃s1 ), where ⌃  Init(1k). We introduce a se-
ries of hybrids (see Figure 1), and the proof can be derived
directly from the indistinguishability between adjacent hy-
brids. We first explain the hybrids and define the notation
used in those experiments.
• Given a tampering function f = (f1, f2) and message
s, the first experiment, Expf,⌃,s0 , is exactly the original
tampering game, Tamperf,⌃s , of Definition 2.3.
• In Expf,⌃,s1 , we slightly modify the previous hybrid by
checking whether the function f2 has modified the hash
value v. Intuitively, by the collision resistance property
of the hash function family Hk, if f2 does not modify
v, then the attack produces a valid codeword, c˜, only
if the parts of c˜ that constitute the pre-image of v˜, are
kept intact, i.e., (r, sk) = (r˜, s˜k), otherwise there is a
collision. In addition, assuming sk = s˜k, we have that,
if e˜ 6= e, then the output of the decoder should be
?, otherwise we break the authenticity under leakage
(v is considered as leakage over sk) property of the
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encryption scheme. On the other hand, if v 6= v˜, the
output of the current experiment is produced as in
Expf,⌃,s0 .
• In Expf,⌃,s2 , we modify the previous experiment for the
case in which v is modified: instead of using the real
decoding procedure, we use the extractor of the hash
function family, to extract a pre-image (rˆ, sˆk), for v˜,
and then compute the output, s˜, with respect to that
pre-image. However, we cannot output s˜ directly as
we still need to check consistency with the output of
f , i.e., we need to check whether (rˆ, sˆk) is equal to
(r˜, s˜k). The indistinguishability between the current
hybrid and the previous one, follows by the 1-more ex-
tractability property of the hash function, which, in-
formally, guarantees that if c˜ is a valid codeword, then
EHAv produces a valid pre-image for v˜, with overwhelm-
ing probability. If the extracted pre-image is consistent
with the one output by f , the current hybrid outputs
a non-bottom value, equal to the one output by the
decoding procedure of Expf,⌃,s1 . On the other hand, if
(rˆ, sˆk) 6= (r˜, s˜k), Lemma 3.2 guarantees that (r˜, s˜k) is
not a valid pre-image for v˜, with overwhelming proba-
bility, and the current experiment properly outputs ?.
Finally, it is straightforward to see, that if v˜ is invalid,
both experiments output ?.
In order to define the extractor EHAv , introduced in
Expf,⌃,s2 , we first need to define Av, auxAv , with re-
spect to hz, v, e, and f = (f1, f2). Formally, we define
the following:
1. (Define Av): Av(hz, v, auxAv ) := ([f2(auxAv , v)]2,
st), where st = (f2(auxAv , v), auxAv , v).
2. (Choose auxiliary info for Av): set auxAv = e.
3. (Existence of the extractor, EHAv , and aux-
iliary input, auxE): Given Av and auxAv , by
the 1-more extractability property of Hk, there
exists an extractor EHAv , with hardwired auxiliary
info, auxE , that computes (rˆ, sˆk)  EHAv (hz, v).
The extractor EHAv is used in Expf,⌃,s2 and all sub-
sequent experiments (for brevity we denote it as
E).
We remind, that, for any vector v, [v]i, denotes the
i-th coordinate of v.
• In Expf,⌃,s3 , we modify the consistency check proce-
dure, so that we access the right part of the codeword,
only through leakage. Instead of checking consistency
using directly the output of f1, we do the check using
a random hash function, h¯, from a universal family (cf.
full version), applied to the output of f1, plus one more
bit, that indicates whether f1 has modified its input.
Here, the hash v is computed through leakage over
sk. The experiment di↵ers from the previous one only
when there is a collision against h¯, which happens with
negligible probability, as h¯ is a universal hash function.
Below, we formalize the above procedure: let h¯  
H¯  1 be a random hash function from a universal hash
function family, that outputs   1 bits. We define the
function gh¯,hz (·) as follows:
gh¯,hz (x, y) =
(
(0, h¯(f1(x, y)), hz(x, y)), if f1(x, y) = (x, y),
(1, h¯(f1(x, y)), hz(x, y)), if f1(x, y) 6= (x, y).
We view gh¯,hz as a leakage function that outputs
  = !(log k) +  (k) bits in total. The experiment will
then use the leaked value to check consistency, instead
of using the whole string output by f1. Concretely,
we introduce the random variable b, which depends
on the output of the leakage function, and we mod-
ify Expf,⌃,s2 , so that the condition “If (b = 1)”, intro-
duced in Expf,⌃,s3 , is exactly the same as the condition
“If (r, sk, e) = (r˜, s˜k, e˜)”, of experiment Expf,⌃,s2 . This
modification does not induce any statistical di↵erence.
In the next modification, we check equality between
(rˆ, sˆk), (r˜, s˜k), by checking if h¯(rˆ, sˆk) = h¯(f1(r, sk)).
Clearly, this part induces a statistical di↵erence only
if there is a collision against h¯, which happens with
negligible probability, since h¯ is a universal hash func-
tion, chosen by the current experiment, independently.
• Finally, we are going to show that Expf,⌃,s3 is indistin-
guishable from Expf,⌃,
!
0
3 , for any message s, where
!
0
denotes the zero-message. This follows by the seman-
tic security of the leakage resilient encryption scheme
(Definition 2.9).
A concrete presentation of the hybrids, is given in Figure 1.
The indistinguishability between the hybrids in proved in
the full version of the paper.
⌅
Length of the CRS. The length of the CRS in our con-
struction is roughly 32k bits: we need to hash a 6k-bit
(roughly) key of an authenticated encryption scheme and
then encrypt the message using that key; this would require
the parameters for the 16-KEA to be on the CRS, resulting
in the 32k bits length.
5. CONSTRUCTING 1-MORE ECRH
In this section, we present our construction of 1-more
extractable hash function families. Our construction is in
two steps: (1) we first present a construction assuming a
coding scheme that satisfies randomness simulatable non-
malleability (RSS-NM), against a ne tampering functions,
and (2) we show how to construct such a code. Finally, we
present Corollary 5.7 to summarize our overall construction,
by putting all things together in a single statement. As we
have already discussed on the introduction, the idea of con-
structing a NM-code for a ne functions, as an intermediate
step for providing split-state codes, was also followed by [4],
still, our technique di↵ers significantly, and their code does
not directly satisfy our requirements. Moreover, in [22] the
authors construct AMD codes, still their notions are slightly
di↵erent and do fit in our framework.
5.1 1-more extractable hash functions from RSS-
NM codes against affine functions
In this section we construct a collision resistant, 1-more
extractable hash function family. Before doing so, we present
the notion of“randomness simulatable, strongly non-malleable
codes”(RSS-NMC). This notion is stronger than strong non-
malleability in the sense that besides simulating the pre-
image, s˜, of the tampered codeword, the simulator also needs
to produce the randomness of the encoder, s˜r, such that the
encoding of s˜ with randomness s˜r, produces the tampered
codeword. To ease the presentation of RSS-NMC, we mod-
ify the syntax of non-malleable codes, so that the Dec algo-
rithm returns, not only the decoded message s˜, but also the
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Expf,⌃,s0 :
(r, sk, e, v) Enc(s), c = (r, sk, e, v)
(r˜, s˜k) f1(r, sk), (e˜, v˜) f2(e, v)
c˜ = (r˜, s˜k, e˜, v˜)
s˜ = Dec(c˜)
Output same⇤ if c˜ = c, and s˜ otherwise.
Expf,⌃,s1 :
(r, sk, e, v) Enc(s)
(r˜, s˜k) f1(r, sk), (e˜, v˜) f2(e, v)
c˜ = (r˜, s˜k, e˜, v˜)
If v = v˜ :
If (r, sk, e) = (r˜, s˜k, e˜) : set s˜ = same⇤
Else : set s˜ = ?
If v 6= v˜ :
Set s˜ = Dec(c˜)
Output s˜.
Expf,⌃,s2 :
(r, sk, e, v) Enc(s)
(r˜, s˜k) f1(r, sk), (e˜, v˜) f2(e, v)
If v = v˜ :
If (r, sk, e) = (r˜, s˜k, e˜) : set s˜ = same⇤
Else : set s˜ = ?
If v 6= v˜ :
(rˆ, sˆk) E(hz, v)
set s˜ = ?
If (rˆ, sˆk) = (r˜, s˜k) :
If hz(rˆ, sˆk) = v˜, set s˜ = Dsˆk(e˜)
Output s˜.
Expf,⌃,s3 :
sk KGen(1k), e Esk(s)
r
$ {0, 1}poly(k), h¯ H¯  1
(lmod, lhash, v) gh¯,hz (r, sk) , (e˜, v˜) f2(e, v)
b (lmod = 0 ^ e = e˜)
If v = v˜ :
If (b = 1) : set s˜ = same⇤
Else : set s˜ = ?
If v 6= v˜ :
(rˆ, sˆk) E(hz, v)
set s˜ = ?
If h¯(rˆ, sˆk) = lhash :
If hz(rˆ, sˆk) = v˜, set s˜ = Dsˆk(e˜)
Output s˜.
Figure 1: Hybrid experiments for the proof of Theorem 4.2. Their programs are based on (Enc,Dec), the
encoding scheme, (KGen,E,D) the encryption scheme, and E, the extractor that is specified in the proof. The
gray part signifies the portion of the code that di↵ers from the previous experiment.
randomness string s˜r for the encoder Enc. This is the string
that in the tampering experiment the simulator should be
able to match.8
Definition 5.1. (randomness simulatable, strongly
non-malleable code) Let (Enc,Dec) be a (, ⌫)-coding sche-
me and F be a family of functions f : {0, 1}⌫ ! {0, 1}⌫ . For
every f 2 F and s 2 {0, 1}, define the tampering experi-
ment
Tamperfs
def
=
⇢
c Enc(s), c˜ f(c), (s˜r, s˜) = Dec(c˜)
Output same⇤ if c˜ = c, and (s˜r, s˜) otherwise.
 
which is a random variable over the randomness of Enc and
Dec. A coding scheme (Enc,Dec) is randomness simulatable,
strongly non-malleable (RSS-NM), with respect to the func-
tion family F , if for every f 2 F and any s0, s1 2 {0, 1},
we have: n
Tamperfs0
o
k2N
⇡
n
Tamperfs1
o
k2N
where “⇡” may refer to statistical, or computational, indis-
tinguishability. For coding schemes in the common reference
string model, the definition is analogous.
Next we present our construction:
Construction 5.2 (1-more extractable hash). Let
G be a group-generation algorithm and let (Enc,Dec) be a
(kt, kt0)-coding scheme, t, t0 = O(poly(k)). An instance of
a (kt, 2k)-compressing hash function family H = (Gen, h) is
defined as follows:
8It is possible to define RSS-NMC without modifying
the operation of Dec at the expense of slightly complicating
the definition of non-malleability. Due to the fact that our
RSS-NMC construction conforms to the modified syntax,
we opt for the simpler alternative.
1. Gen(1k): sample (G, g, p)  G(1k), (a, r) $ Zp ⇥ Zt0p ,
where p = |G|, and output z = (G, gr, gar).
2. Hashing computation: on input s = (s1, . . . , st),
sample sr
$ U{0,1}poly(k) , compute hz(sr, s) = (ghr,ci,
ghar,ci), where c Enc(sr, s).
For coding schemes (Init,Enc,Dec) in the CRS model, Gen(1k)
outputs (z,⌃), where ⌃ Init(1k).
In the following we prove that Construction 5.2, which is a
composition of a coding scheme (Enc,Dec), with construc-
tion 3.3 (the 0-more extractable hash function by Bitan-
sky et al. [10]), is collision resistant, 1-more extractable,
and uniform under leakage, assuming that (Enc,Dec), satis-
fies certain properties. Then, in Section 5.2, we instantiate
(Enc,Dec) with the desired properties. Below, we prove that
Construction 5.2 is collision resistant.
Lemma 5.3. Let G be any group generation algorithm.
Then, assuming the hardness of the discrete logarithm prob-
lem on G, and the underlying encoding algorithm is injective,
Construction 5.2 is collision resistant with respect to G.
Proof. The work [10] proves that the hash function fam-
ily of Construction 3.3, i.e., H⇤, is collision resistant, as-
suming the di culty of the discrete logarithm problem. We
note that Construction 5.2 is a composition of Enc(·) and
H⇤. Following a simple fact that any injective function com-
posed with a collision resistant hash function still results in a
collision resistant hash function (composition in any order),
we can conclude that the hash function family of Construc-
tion 5.2 is collision resistant, under the same assumption.
⌅
In the following theorem, we prove that, under certain
assumptions, Construction 5.2, is 1-more extractable.
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Theorem 5.4. Let t(k), t0(k) = O(poly(k)), (Enc,Dec)
be any RSS-non-malleable, (kt, kt0)-coding scheme, against
Fa↵ , let H be the hash function family of Construction 5.2
with respect to (Init,Enc,Dec), and assume that for any mes-
sage s, H1 (Enc(s))   k+!(log k). Then, assuming t0-KEA
and the hardness of DLog, H is 1-more extractable, with re-
spect to (Init,Enc,Dec).
Proof. For k 2 N, let (Enc,Dec) be anRSS-NM, (kt, kt0)-
coding scheme, against Fa↵ , t(k), t0(k) = O(poly(k)), and let
H be the (kt, 2k)-compressing, collision-resistant, hash func-
tion family of Construction 5.2. Following Definition 3.1, we
need to prove that for any PPT algorithm Av with auxiliary
input auxAv , there exist extractor EHAv and auxiliary input
auxE , such that for any PPT algorithm As, any large k and
every message s = (s1, . . . , st) 2 Ztp,
Pr
hz Hk

Exps,hzAv,As,EHAv
(1, auxAv , auxE) = 1
 
 negl(k). (1)
Clearly, if Av fails to produce a new valid hash, or, if As
fails to produce a valid pre-image for the new hash, the
experiment simply outputs 0, and there is no challenge for
the extractor. Therefore, the interesting case is when Av
produces a valid hash value, say v˜, while having access to
an element in the range of the hash, say v, and As produces
a valid pre-image for v˜, while having access to s, v, v˜, and
any other state information produced by Av. Hence, for
the rest of the proof we assume v˜ 6= v, and (s˜r, s˜) is a valid
pre-image for v˜, i.e., hz(s˜r, s˜) = v˜.
Given any Av with auxiliary input auxAv , the idea behind
the definition of the extractor, EHAv , and its auxiliary input,
auxE , goes as follows:
• First we define an adversary against the hash func-
tion familyH⇤, of Construction 3.3: A¯v(h⇤z0 , auxAv ) :=
Av(hz, v, auxAv ), where A¯v first interprets the descrip-
tion of the hash function h⇤z0 , as (hz, v), i.e., as a de-
scription of a hash function in H and a hash value v,
and then executes Av(hz, v, auxAv ). The function h⇤z0
will be stated concretely below.
• Since H⇤ is a 0-more extractable hash function family,
and assuming h⇤z0 is indistinguishable from an element
in H⇤, there exists an extractor E¯H⇤A¯v with its auxiliary
input auxE¯ , that extracts a valid pre-image for v˜, with
respect to h⇤z0 . We define the auxiliary input auxE :=
auxE¯ .
The extractor is defined below.
The extractor EHAv :
Input: (z = (gr, gar), v = (gr
0
, gar
0
), auxE).
1. Set z0 = (gr, gr
0
, gar, gar
0
). Here, we interpret z0 as
a description of hash function h⇤z0 2 H⇤, for vector
messages with t0 + 1 coordinates.
2. Sample (b1, . . . , bt0 , d)  E¯H⇤A¯v (h⇤z0 , auxE) and set f =
(b1, . . . , bt0 , d) = (b, d) 2 Zt0+1p .
3. Interpret f as an a ne function that on input (x1, . . .
xt0) outputs (dx1+b1, dx2+b2, . . . , dxt0+bt0), and then
sample (sˆr, sˆ) Da↵f , whereDa↵f is the simulator of the
underlying RSS-NM code, (Enc,Dec), parameterized
by the a ne function f .
4. Output: (sˆr, sˆ).
The extractor is defined with respect to any input v, still
by the definition of the `-more experiment, v is always a
valid hash value, i.e., v = hz(s) = (g
hr,ci, gahr,ci), where
c  Enc(sr, s), for some message s. Then, for any As,
and message s, we are going to analyze the execution of
Exps,hzAv,As,EHAv
(1, auxAv , auxE). We first prove that with over-
whelming probability, the following events happen:
• E1: h⇤z0(b1, . . . , bt0 , b0) = v˜. Recall that v˜ is the output
of Av on input (hz, v).
• E2: Enc(s˜r, s˜) = f(c). Recall that (s˜r, s˜) is the output
of As.
We formalize those ideas in a series of claims, where their
concrete proofs are given in the full version of the paper.
⌅5.2 Constructing RSS-NM codes
In this section, we construct RSS-NM codes as required
by the previous section.
Construction 5.5 (The code for Fa↵). For any k 2
N, t = O(poly(k)), we define a (kt, (2t+4)k)-coding scheme
(Init,Enc,Dec) in the CRS model,9 as follows:
• Init(1k): sample a k-bit prime p 2 (2k 1, 2k) and set
⌃ = p.
• Enc(⌃, ·): let s = (s1, . . . , st) 2 Ftp be the input to
Enc. Sample two random field elements v, r
$ Fp, and
then output c =
 
v, v2, r, r2, u1, u
2
1, . . . , ut, u
2
t
  2 F2t+4p ,
where ui = si   r for i 2 [t].
• Dec(⌃, ·): on input c = (v, v¯, r, r¯, u1, u¯1, . . . , ut, u¯t),
the decoder checks whether v¯ = v2, r¯ = r2, and u¯i = u
2
i
for all i 2 [t]. If so, then it outputs (v, r, u1 + r, u2 +
r, . . . , ut + r), otherwise, outputs ?.
All operations are performed modulo p. We also consider the
deterministic version of Enc by allowing the randomness to
be given on the input. In that case we have c = Enc(⌃, sr, s),
where sr = (v, r).
Notice, that, the randomness employed by the above con-
struction is 2k, independently of the message length.
Theorem 5.6. The code of Construction 5.5 is random-
ness simulatable, strongly non-malleable (Definition 5.1), with
respect to Fa↵ . In addition, for any message s, H1 (Enc(s))  
k + !(log k).
The proof intuition is presented in the introduction and
the concrete proof is given in the full version of this paper.
5.3 Our resulting instantiation
By plugging Construction 5.5, as the underlying coding
scheme to Construction 5.2, we receive the corollary:
Corollary 5.7. Under the DLog assumption and t-KEA,
there exists a 1-more extractable, collision resistant, hash
function family Hk.
Proof. Let (Init,Enc,Dec) be the (kt, (2t + 4)k), RSS-
NM code of Construction 5.5. Then we construct Hk by
plugging in (Init,Enc,Dec), as the underlying coding scheme
to the hash function family of Construction 5.2. Clearly,
9Note that the CRS is not essential for this encoding, but
for simplicity we describe the code in this model.
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by Lemma 5.3, Hk is collision resistant as the underlying
encoding algorithm is injective. By Theorem 5.6, the under-
lying coding scheme is RSS-non-malleable against Fa↵ , and
moreover, for any message s, H1 (Enc(s))   k + !(log k).
Thus, by Theorem 5.4, Hk is 1-more extractable. This con-
cludes the proof of this corollary. ⌅
6. CONSTRUCTING `-MORE EXTRACTA-
BLE HASH
In the “`-more” setting, the attacker is given v1, . . . , v`,
hash values, and produces a new hash value v˜. Having the
techniques from the “1-more” setting, one can easily argue
the attack against v˜ (in the `-more setting), can be reduced
to an a ne attack against the codewords c1, . . . , c`, that
are related to v1, . . . , v`, respectively. In order to construct
`-more ECRH, for ` > 1, we generalize the notion of RSS-
NM codes, for multiple codewords. The generalization is a
straightforward extension of Definition 5.1, where the tam-
pering function receives ` codewords and the simulator needs
to recover the message and randomness in case the output of
the tampering function is not among the given codewords.
The formal is definition is given in the full version.
Clearly, for ` = 1, the notion of multi-codeword RSS-
NMC matches Definition 5.1. In order to construct, `-more
ECRH, for ` > 1, we need an RSS-NM code, for the follow-
ing function class.
Definition 6.1 (The function class F¯`a↵). We define
the following function class
F¯`a↵ = {f(x1, . . . , x`) = f1(x1) + . . .+ f`(x`) | fi 2 Fa↵}.
We present the following lemma.
Lemma 6.2. The code of Construction 5.5, (Enc,Dec), is
a multi-codeword RSS-NM code against F¯`a↵ , for ` > 1.
Proof. A proof sketch is given in the full version. ⌅
In the “`-more” setting the attacker receives vi = (g
hr,cii,
gahr,cii), i 2 [`], and constructs a valid hash v˜. The proof of
Theorem 5.4 easily extends to the “`-more” setting by prov-
ing that v˜ = ghr,
P`
i=1 fi(ci)i, gahr,
P`
i=1 fi(ci)i), where (f1, . . . ,
f`) 2 F¯`a↵ , and we achieve extractability using the simulator
of the underlying, rss-nmc for multiple codewords. Thus,
we are able to show the following theorem.
Theorem 6.3. Under the DLog assumption and t-KEA,
Construction 5.2, instantiated with the Construction 5.5, is
an `-more extractable hash function family.
The proof is essentially the same as that of Theorem 5.4, as
we discussed above.
7. INSTANTIATINGAUTHENTICATEDEN-
CRYPTION
In the following we instantiate one-time leakage-resilient,
authenticated, semantically secure symmetric encryption (Def-
inition 2.9), against   bits of leakage. The idea is to combine
a leakage-resilient pseudorandom generator [46] with a mes-
sage authentication code that outputs k bits.
Construction 7.1 (Authenticated encryption). Let
PRG be a pseudo-random generator, i.e., PRG : {0, 1}2  !
{0, 1}|s|+k, and let (Gen,Mac,Vrfy) be a message authentica-
tion code that outputs tags of length k (cf. [39]). We define
a symmetric encryption scheme (KGen,E,D), as follows:
• KGen(1k): sample sk $ {0, 1}2 .
• Esk(·): On input message s, compute (r0, r1) = PRG(sk),
where |r0| = |s| and |r1| = k, e = r0+s, t = Macr1(e),
and outputs (e, t).
• Dsk(·): On input (e, t), compute (r0, r1) = PRG(sk),
and if Vrfyr1(e, t) = 1, output s = r0   e, otherwise
output ?.
The PRG of [46] considers |sk| = 2 /↵, and sustains ↵  bits
of leakage (cf. [50]), where ↵ 2 [0, 1] depends on how strong
the underlying assumption is. In the above construction
we use the strongest assumption, i.e., ↵ = 1, which yields
|sk| = 2 . The ciphertext length is |s|+k, and by setting   =
2k+log2 k, which is adequate for our needs, we receive |sk|+
|e|+|t| = 5k+2 log2 k+|s|. In the full version we analyze the
above construction and we provide instantiations that use
weaker assumptions. By plugging the above instantiation to
our split-state non-malleable code, the total codeword length
is |s|+9 · k+2 · log2(k), since the hash and the randomness
for computing it, are of size 2k, each.
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